Live on Solana Devnet

Bots steal fromevery swap.

Lattice seals orders with SHA-256 cryptography before they touch the blockchain. Bots can’t front-run what they can’t see.

MEV extracted from DEX traders in 2024
$0
Source: Flashbots, EigenPhi  ·  Lattice bot profit: $0.00
$99.74
stolen per $10K swap (regular DEX)
$0.00
bot profit on Lattice (mathematical)
64
sealed order slots per batch
100%
on-chain · devnet live fully auditable
The same $10,000 trade

Two completely different outcomes

REGULAR DEX
Uniswap · Raydium · any AMM
VULNERABLE
Your tx broadcast to mempool
PUBLICLY VISIBLE
Bot detects your order
MONITORING MEMPOOL
BOT
Bot inserts itself ahead
FRONT-RUN
ATTACK
You fill at a worse price
−$99.74 EXTRACTED
Bot extracted
$99.74
You received
99.23 SOL
should've been 100.22 SOL
LATTICE PROTOCOL
Dual-Flow Batch Auction · Solana devnet
PROTECTED
Order sealed as SHA-256 hash
CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY HIDDEN
7a3f9b2e1c8d4f60
Commit window closes
BOTS SEE NOTHING
BLOCKED
All orders reveal at once
SIMULTANEOUS REVEAL
p* = 99 USDC/SOL
UNIFORM CLEARING PRICE
Bot extracted
$0.00
You received
100.22 SOL
exactly what you deserved
Protocol mechanics

How Lattice makes it impossible

01
Seal

Submit a SHA-256 hash of your order. Price, amount, direction — all hidden. Not even validators know your intent.

sha256(in+out+amount+price+salt)
02
Wait

The commit window closes after N slots. No new orders enter. Bots have nothing to react to — zero attack surface.

~20 slots commit · ~15 slots reveal
03
Clear

All traders reveal simultaneously. The Walrasian algorithm finds one fair price where supply meets demand. Every order fills at identical p*.

p* = argmax_p min(cumBuy(≥p), cumSell(≤p))
HTTP 402 · 1999 → 2026
402
HTTP Status Code
Payment Required
Reserved for Future Use · 1999

In 1999, the architects of the modern web reserved this code for one reason: they knew machines would eventually need a native way to pay each other. The technology wasn't ready. For 27 years, Code 402 sat dormant — a ghost in the machine.

2026 · Resolved

Lattice is that future. Our autonomous liquidity agents use the x402 standard to programmatically pay for MEV-shielding. When an agent encounters a 402, it doesn't stop — it negotiates, signs, and pays the relay fee to secure a private Jito bundle.

The internet's oldest reserved code finally has its purpose.

agent · x402 relay flow
POST /relay/bundle HTTP/1.1
Authorization: none
HTTP/1.1402Payment Required
X-Payment-Scheme: x402/solana
X-Payment-Amount: 5000 lamports
X-Payment-Recipient: relay.lattice.xyz
// agent parses 402 terms, signs micropayment
agentsignTransaction(fee: 5000 lamports)
agentPOST /relay/bundle
X-Payment: <signed-receipt>
HTTP/1.1200OK
X-Bundle-Id: jito://9f3a…c2d1
X-MEV-Shield: private · skip mempool
Private Jito bundle secured. MEV structurally impossible.
Technical spec

Built for production

program.log
networkSolana devnet
programAW8zeS7…F6iV
languageRust + Anchor 0.30.1
state#[zero_copy] · 64-slot book · 7296 bytes
clearingWalrasian uniform price (Dual-Flow Batch)
relayx402 HTTP micropayment · Jito private bundles
mevstructurally impossible (commit-reveal)
auditPre-audit — required before mainnet
VARA 2026 · Non-Custodial DeFi
Non-custodial DeFi carve-out
Custody of user funds
None — PDA vaults only
Front-running capability
Cryptographically impossible
Information privilege
None — sealed until clearing
Wash trading profitability
Zero — uniform price
Smart contract audit
Pre-audit (hackathon prototype)
Upgrade authority
Recommend multisig + 7d timelock
Full VARA compliance doc →
It’s live. Right now. On Solana devnet.

Stop paying bots.
Trade with Lattice.

Watch a real batch auction run in 60 seconds — sealed orders, live slot countdown, Walrasian clearing, verifiable on Solana Explorer.

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